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Abstract
We study the effects of stock market volatility on risk-taking and financial crises
by constructing a cross-country database spanning up to 211 years and 60 coun-
tries. Prolonged periods of low volatility have strong in-sample and out-of-sample
predictive power over the incidence of banking crises and can be used as a reliable
crisis indicator, whereas volatility itself does not predict crises. Low volatility leads
to excessive credit build-ups and balance sheet leverage in the financial system,
indicating that agents take more risk in periods of low risk, supporting the dictum
that “stability is destabilizing.”
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1 Introduction
“Volatility in markets is at low levels...to the extent that low levels of volatility
may induce risk-taking behavior...is a concern to me and to the Committee.”
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen.1
Do unusual levels of financial market volatility imply an increased likelihood of a
subsequent financial crisis? Common wisdom maintains that it does, pointing to the
low volatility in the United States in the years prior to the 2008 crisis. It is backed
up by the theoretical literature, which finds clear channels for how volatility affects
the likelihood of crises. Perhaps the best expression of this view is Minsky’s (1977)
instability hypothesis, where economic agents observing low financial risk are induced
to increase risk-taking, which in turn may lead to a crisis—the foundation of his famous
dictum that “stability is destabilizing.” Our main objective is to empirically investigate
the link between stock market volatility, risk-taking, and financial crises to understand
whether prolonged periods of stability lead to systemic events.
The view that economic agents change their risk-taking behavior when financial
market risk changes has a long history in the economic literature. Early theoretical
work suggests that risk affects economic decisions, especially when it deviates from
what economic agents have come to expect. This idea is expressed, for example, in
Hayek (1960) and Keynes’s (1936) notion of animal spirits. If the resulting risk-taking is
excessive, it may, in extremis, culminate in a financial crisis. While there are a number
of factors that could cause such an outcome, our interest is in the attitude of economic
agents to risk, measured by financial market volatility.
Adverse effects of low volatility on financial stability is consistent with Brunner-
meier and Sannikov’s (2014) “volatility paradox,” where low volatility can paradoxically
increase the probability of a systemic event, and Bhattacharya et al. (2015), who exam-
ine Minsky’s hypothesis in a model with endogenous defaults, where agents update their
optimistic expectations during good times, increasing risk-taking. Similarly, Danielsson
1Comments from her press conference following the June, 18 2014 FOMC meeting.
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et al. (2012) propose a general equilibrium framework with risk constraints, where up
on observing low volatility, agents are endogenously incentivized to increase risk.
During low volatility periods, a cause of excessive risk-taking is overoptimism.
Agents are not able to measure the actual risk (the underlying latent risk), but they
can infer it through the realized market prices, or volatility. Hence, during tranquil pe-
riods, when perceived risk is low, economic agents may be misled into taking too much
risk. Such a desire to increase risk-taking can manifest itself via two related mechanisms:
excess lending and excess leverage. While similar, lending and leverage affect the likeli-
hood of financial crises differently, since we consider lending as aggregate credit across
the economy and leverage as the balance sheet composition of financial institutions.
In the model of Simsek (2013), optimistic agents exert a significant impact on
collateralized asset prices, ultimately increasing aggregate credit in the economy. In
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014), lenders feel more secure when volatility is low, which
encourages them to borrow more. However, such excessive lending may create an adverse
outcome, as established in several papers. Greenwood and Hanson (2013) find that in
such boom periods, the quality of loans is getting increasingly poor, elevating credit
risk. Schularick and Taylor (2012) find strong support for credit booms increasing the
likelihood of a banking crisis. More recently, Baron and Xiong (2016) study whether
bank equity holders anticipate the severe consequences of credit expansions on financial
stability and whether they demand a risk premium as compensation. They demonstrate
a presence of overoptimism by bank shareholders during tranquil periods and show that
following such overoptimism, bank credit expansion predicts increased bank equity crash
risk. Building upon their findings, we study the first element of this feedback loop: Long-
lasting periods of low volatility is expected to breed overoptimism, and hence, we test
whether low volatility is an important determinant of excessive lending, and in turn
increases the likelihood of a banking crisis.
Low volatility can also increase the likelihood of a crisis via financial system balance
sheet leverage. Adrian and Shin (2010) find empirically that leverage can be pro-cyclical,
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increasing during booms. Adrian and Shin (2014) argue that such pro-cyclicality is a
consequence of active risk management. Because volatility is an input into risk manage-
ment processes, low volatility allows financial institutions to take riskier positions for a
given threshold and to increase their balance sheet leverage. Thus, in such low volatility
periods, financial intermediaries who seek higher yields may lend further or reallocate
from safer to riskier assets.
High volatility may also anticipate a financial crisis as it is a signal of growing
uncertainty, be it economic, financial, or policy related. Baker et al. (2016) and Gulen
and Ion (2016) find that high stock volatility is associated with high policy uncertainty,
reducing investment, output, and employment. Engle et al. (2013) show that stock
market volatility is related with output and inflation uncertainty. Similarly, in the real
options literature, high volatility increases the value of an option to invest, delaying
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and adversely affecting the economy.
In our empirical investigation of the volatility–crises relationship, we face two paths.
We could focus on recent history with ample economic and financial statistics. However,
this would limit us to data from the past few decades at best. Since crises are not
frequent—once every 37 years for a typical OECD country according to the banking crisis
database of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)—the resulting sample size would inevitably be
small. Alternatively, we could exploit long-term historical relationships over multiple
decades and centuries, but at the expense of more limited data. We opted for the long-
term historical view, believing it to be a better way to obtain statistically meaningful
relationships between volatility and crises.
To this end, we construct a cross-country historical database on volatilities, created
from monthly returns of real stock market indices. The sample covers 60 countries and
spans 211 years, resulting in 3700 country-year observations, with 62 years of historical
observations per country, on average. Our main interest is in banking crises, and we
use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) database.2 The resulting unbalanced panel contains
2To check the robustness of our findings, we also employ alternative banking crisis histories of Bordo
et al. (2001); Laeven and Valencia (2008); Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012); Schularick and Taylor (2012);
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a binary indicator of whether a banking crisis starts in a given year and country, and
includes 259 distinct banking crises.
The next step is to estimate annual volatilities. While we could have used Engle’s
(1982) ARCH or Bollerslev’s (1986,1987) GARCH models, or some extensions thereof,
we opted for realized volatility for two main reasons. First, the evidence of GARCH
effects is much weaker in monthly returns than in typical applications with daily returns.
Second, GARCH volatilities will revert to a single long-run level, whereas in the long
samples as we have, there appear to be more than one long-run volatility level, and
realized volatilities are better able to capture this.
To examine whether low volatility predicts crisis, we need to decompose the volatil-
ity into high and low components. Borrowing terminology from the output gap literature,
we define high and low volatility as the deviations of volatility from above and below its
trend, respectively, where trend is estimated through a one-sided Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) filter. A one-sided filter uses only past information to estimate the trend for
a given time, while a two-sided filter would use future information. This approach is
particularly important in our case as we need to quantify what “usual” volatility is.
Given that we observe various regimes throughout the history, using the whole sample
to estimate long-run volatility would be misleading.
We find that the level of volatility does not predict banking crises, while prolonged
periods of low volatility do. Low volatility has a strong in-sample and out-of-sample
predictive power over the incidence of a crisis. The economic impact is the highest if
the economy stays in the low volatility environment for five years: a 1% decrease in
volatility below its trend translates to a 1.01% increase in the probability of a crisis.
We further show that low volatility delivers a strong signal-to-noise ratio, significantly
beating random noise, suggesting that it can be used as a reliable crisis indicator by
policymakers. The results are robust to different definitions of volatility and alternative
Romer and Romer (2015). The results are qualitatively similar to using Reinhart and Rogoff (2009),
so we opted for the latter as it is the most comprehensive one both in time-series and cross-sectional
dimensions.
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model specifications. Finally, we find weak evidence that high volatility increases the
likelihood of banking crises.
We then investigate the two mechanisms for how low volatility may lead to a
financial crisis: excess credit and leverage. We are unable to test them with our entire
historical dataset as credit and balance sheet leverage data are limited in both the time
and the cross-section dimensions. By using BIS data from the 1960s for 37 countries, we
find that long-lasting periods of low volatility induce excessive lending. We then use the
cross country balance sheet leverage (assets/equity) data of Lee et al. (2017), which cover
31 countries spanning from 1980s and find that the financial sector leverage increases
following low volatility periods, even after controlling for lending growth. These results
suggest that financial system stability endogenously creates instability through lending
booms and excess leverage.
Finally, splitting our 211-year sample into various sub-periods, we find that the
relationship between financial market volatility and the incidence of a crisis becomes
stronger over time—not surprising, considering that prior to World War I, stock markets,
and hence market volatility, played a much smaller role in the economy than they would
later.
Financial market volatility is of clear interest to policymakers, as seen by the open-
ing quote from Chair Yellen. Within the post-2008 crisis macroprudential agenda, pol-
icymakers are actively searching for signals of future financial and economic instability
and developing policy tools to mitigate the most unfortunate outcomes. Volatility is a
key ingredient in some indicators, such as the European Central Bank’s Systemic Stress
Composite Indicator. Our results indicate that it might be better for policy authorities
to include low volatility as a crisis indicator since an observation of current low volatility
implies that a future crisis is more likely.
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2 Data and descriptive analysis
2.1 Volatility
We construct a database on historical volatility for 60 countries, some dating back to
1800 by using stock market price data from Global Financial Data (GFD), a database
that specializes in aggregating data collected by economic historians. We use monthly
stock prices as daily prices are quite scarce. While we can go back to the early 20th
century for the United States, for the rest of the countries daily price data only exists
from the second part of the 20th century. Moreover, since we are interested in the effects
of volatility on financial crises, where the latter is measured at the annual frequency,
monthly stock market returns are sufficient.
Table 1 shows the list of the 25 developed and 35 emerging countries in our sam-
ple (based on the IMF’s classification), sample coverage, and the names of the market
indexes. Only data for the United States and the Great Britain are available from 1800,
while we have data for France, Germany, and Australia from the mid-19th century. A
large number of countries developed stock markets after the World War I. All the sample
countries have data for 2010, except Zambia.
Since many of the countries in the sample have experienced high inflation at times,
it is necessary to adjust the stock market data for inflation, for which we use the consumer
price index (CPI) data from GFD.3 Not surprisingly, in such a comprehensive sample,
a number of extreme observations occur, often due to disruptive events like war and
hyperinflation. In such cases, volatility estimates are likely to be biased and consequently
it may be preferable to bound extreme observations (Han, 2013). Hence, in baseline
specifications, we winsorize 1% of monthly real returns. More specifically, if a given
country’s real monthly return is above its 99.5th percentile, we set the return at the top
3For 30% of the observations monthly CPI is not available and we use linear interpolation to obtain
monthly CPI. This interpolation should not be problematic because the CPI moves much more slowly
than the stock markets and therefore any interpolation error would only marginally affect the volatility.
Indeed, the average correlation of volatilities across countries, calculated using nominal or real returns,
exceed 0.98 and our main findings are unaltered when we estimate volatility using nominal returns.
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99.5th percentile value. Note that the main results hold regardless of whether we use
non-winsorized returns or winsorization at the 1% and 5% level.
The next step is to model volatility, both to capture shorter-term volatility clus-
tering and longer-term level changes. The volatility literature emphasizes two main
approaches. The first is the direct modeling of autoregressive volatility, as pioneered by
Engle’s (1982) ARCH process. For example, we could have used Bollerslev’s (1986,1987)
GARCH model, or other extensions.4 The main alternative to the (G)ARCH class of
models is realized volatility; the standard deviation of returns over a sample period.
The choice of which modeling approach is the best to take depends to a considerable
extent on the sampling frequency. The available literature, for example French et al.
(1987), finds that neither GARCH nor realized volatilities are inherently better in their
application of daily returns and monthly volatilities. In our case, realized volatility is a
better choice. Not only is the evidence of GARCH effects much lower in monthly returns
than in typical applications with daily returns (e.g., Zivot, 2009), GARCH volatilities
will revert to a single long-run level, whereas in the long sample we have, there appear
to be more than one long-run volatility levels and for situations where volatility changes
rapidly to a new level, GARCH volatilities would be slow at “catching up” (Andersen
et al., 2003). We did evaluate a GARCH(1,1) model and the absolute value of returns
as alternative volatility estimators in the robustness analysis and find that our results
do not change qualitatively.
We estimate the annual volatility as the standard deviation of 12 monthly returns
using mid-year observations. Specifically, monthly returns from July in year t − 1 up
to June in year t are used to calculate volatility in year t, so the volatility estimates
use non-overlapping samples of returns. While it might seem natural to use January to
December as the 12 month-period, in our database we do not know the starting month
of a crisis. Even if it were marked, it is hard to verify the precise timing of a crisis as
4There is an extensive literature on volatility modeling following from the ARCH/GARCH models,
including the ones that develop methods to identify long-run and short-run volatility, like Engle and
Rangel (2008); Adrian and Rosenberg (2008), FIGARCH (Baillie et al., 1996), and the MIDAS class of
models (see e.g. Chen and Ghysels, 2011).
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it could have realistically started earlier. For instance, an actual bank run or receipt
of government assistance usually comes well after the financial problems start. In such
a case, volatility estimates from January to December would overlap with periods of
financial distress, especially for a crisis that hits early in the year. Hence, to minimize
the impact of crisis on volatility, we opted to leave 6 months of gap and use mid year
returns. In Section 5, we show that the results are not sensitive to the chosen period to
calculate annual volatility.
Figure 1 shows the time-series plot of annual volatility for the United States, the
monthly real returns and the resulting winsorized annual volatility, while the Web Ap-
pendix, www.ModelsandRisk.org/volatility-and-crises, contains similar analyses
for every country in the sample. In line with earlier studies, such as Officer (1973)
and Schwert (1989, 1990), we see that many periods of high volatility in the United
States correspond to recessions and crises. The highest volatilities are observed during
the Great Depression and the late 1930s recession, followed by the 1850s recession, the
early 1970s recession, the 1987 crash, and the 2008 Global Financial crisis. In the entire
sample, all episodes, where winsorization is applied correspond to wars, major crises,
and/or hyperinflation periods.
2.2 Descriptive analysis: volatility
Within our 211 years of historical sample period, we witness many different economic
and market structures that dramatically affect the stock market developments and fi-
nancial volatility. In the beginning of the sample, we have very few countries and no
electronic communication, while by 2010 we have advanced integrated financial and
economic systems. Stock markets have become steadily important over time. In the ear-
liest part of the sample, few economic agents had access to stock markets and banking.
While individual bank accounts had become quite common in the United Kingdom by
the mid-1800s, that was not the case for the other early history countries (Elliot, 2006).
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Figure 1: Return and volatility estimates, United States
In this figure, we present monthly real stock market returns, winsorized at the 1% level, and the
winsorized annual volatility estimates for the United States. Volatility is calculated as the standard
deviation of 12 monthly real returns.
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Stock markets first start to play a major economic role in the interwar years, and then
primarily in the United States.
Figure 2 shows the average volatility and monthly return correlations, focusing on
different periods. Although there are many interesting periods within our sample that
merit special attention, to keep the discussion tractable, we focus on six: the pre-gold
period (1800–1872), the gold standard era (1873–1913), the interwar years (1919–1938),
Bretton Woods (1949–1972), the Great Moderation (1985–2006), and finally the whole
sample.
For each time period, we first calculate the volatility of a given country or bilateral
correlations, and then, we report the cross-sectional averages. To ensure comparable
results, we keep the same set of countries across time. When new countries enter the
sample, we identify them with a new colored bar. For instance, a blue bar in all of
the panels corresponds to the four countries used to calculate the metric whose data
is available in the pre-gold period, namely USA, UK, France, and Germany. The total
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Figure 2: Volatility and correlations: sub-periods
In Panels (a) and (b), we present the average volatility and monthly return correlations for different
periods ,respectively. Given the time period, we first calculate the volatility for each country, and then,
we calculate the cross-sectional averages. Each color corresponds to a group of countries that kept across
time. For instance, the blue bar in Panel (a) corresponds to the group of countries used to calculate
the metric whose data is available in the pre-gold period. After calculating bilateral correlations, we
report the cross-sectional averages. The pre-gold (1800–1872), gold (1873–1913), interwar (1919–1938),
Bretton Woods (1949–1972), and the Great Moderation (1985–2006) periods as well as the whole sample
period (1800–2010), are considered. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the previous 12
winsorized monthly real returns, scaled by
√
12, and the whole sample includes 60 countries. The total
number of countries for which we have data and used to calculate averages/correlations in a given time
period is reported on top of each bar. Emerging and developed countries’ classifications are adopted
from the IMF definition.
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number of countries for which we have data and used to calculate averages/correlations
in a given time period is reported on top of each bar.
For most of the pre-gold period, only two countries are present in the sample, the
United States and the United Kingdom and they are only linked by electronic communi-
cation from 1858. Germany and France emerge around the middle of the 19th century.
Hence, not surprisingly, the correlation between the sample countries is low at about
7% and volatilities are below the sample average. During the gold standard, in a period
of rapid economic growth and globalization, we observe the lowest volatilities in the
sample and increased correlations. During both periods, financial markets are essen-
tially unregulated, and the number of limited liability corporations is relatively small,
but growing over time. Almost all banks are partnerships and hence have different in-
centives of risk-taking to their modern counterparts, which are mostly limited liability
corporations.
Equity markets start to become increasingly important vehicles for investment and
financing during the interwar era. After World War I, more countries, including emerg-
ing ones, develop stock markets and hence entering into our sample. We observe that
volatilities increase considerably during this era. During the Bretton Woods era, fi-
nancial markets become highly regulated and international capital flows are severely
restricted, limiting cross-border investment. Not surprisingly, volatilities fall notably.
When the Bretton Woods system collapses, markets become more deregulated, electronic
trading emerges and international capital flow restrictions are lifted, both correlations
and volatilities increase sharply, reaching their maximum during the Great Moderation
(1985–2006) period. Markets in developed countries are especially correlated due to the
effects of globalization and widespread use of electronic trading.
2.3 Decomposing volatility into high and low
Figure 1 suggests that the long-run level of volatility for the United States is not con-
stant, exhibiting a slow-moving, non-monotone trend spanning multiple decades. Simi-
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lar patterns exist for other countries. Furthermore, volatility differs considerably across
countries. These two combined effects—the presence of a slow-moving trend and het-
erogeneous volatility levels—need to be addressed in the empirical analysis since a par-
ticular measurement of volatility could be seen as high, low, or typical, depending on
the country or year.
We do that by decomposing volatility with the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP)
filter into trend and deviation from trend, in different contexts referred to as cycle.5
The HP filter is based on using a smoothing parameter λ, which quantifies the degree
to which volatility deviates from its trend. The volatility trend is obtained from the
following optimization problem:
min
{τt(λ)}Tt=1
T∑
t=1
[σt − τt(λ)]2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
{[τt+1(λ)− τt(λ)]− [τt(λ)− τt−1(λ)]}2 , (1)
where σt is volatility and τt(λ) is trend, which is a function of λ. The higher the λ,
the smoother the trend. The choice of λ depends on the nature of the underlying series
being filtered. With annual GDP, λ is typically set at 6.25. For a clustering time-series
like volatility, a larger λ is needed, otherwise, the procedure would assign a very large
fraction of temporary swings to the trend making it almost the same as volatility itself.
However, a very large λ is not ideal neither as increasing the persistence of the filter
may remove long-run factors such as structural changes in the financial or regulatory
system. Hence, we set λ = 5000, but as discussed in the robustness section, our results
are invariant to a range of values.
As our analysis builds on predictive regressions, we use only past information when
constructing the explanatory variables. This implies using a one-sided HP filter, con-
5Alternatively, one could adopt Markov switching models, for modeling the trend levels of volatility,
along the lines of Hamilton and Susmel (1994). However, given our sample size, with Markov switching
we are limited to most two regimes, and in addition the distinction between the regimes is sharp, we
jump from one to the other. Our data indicates that there are more than two regimes and the transition
from one to the other is relatively smooth.
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structed by running the HP filter recursively through time by using only data available
up to year t to estimate the trend for year t.
In order to identify the high and low volatility channels, we further separate the de-
viation of volatility from its trend into two components, high and low volatility, denoted
by δhight (λ) and δ
low
t (λ), respectively.
δhight (λ) =


σt − τt(λ) if σt ≥ τt(λ)
0 otherwise,
δlowt (λ) =


σt − τt(λ) if σt < τt(λ)
0 otherwise.
(2)
Figure 3 visualizes the volatility, trend, and high and low components of volatility
for the United States, with the corresponding plots for the rest of the countries remanded
to the Web Appendix. Note that due to data limitations, we could not estimate the trend
for Bolivia and Zambia. In Table 2, we present the cross-sectional and time-series mean,
median, and standard deviation of annual volatility, and high and low components, for
the whole sample, emerging, and developed countries separately. Annual volatility is
higher for the emerging countries, with Turkey reaching over 50% on average. Volatility
deviates from its long-run level by about 3% up and down on average, and the deviation
is higher for emerging countries compared to the developed ones.
2.4 Financial crisis data
We base our analysis on the banking crises in Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) database.
A banking crisis is defined as an event with a closure, merger, or public takeover of one
or more financial institutions or large scale government assistance of a systemically im-
portant financial institution. The sample includes 60 countries with both volatility and
banking crisis data coverage. In total, we observe 259 banking crises, which combined
with volatility data lead to a sample of 3700 country-year pairs.
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Figure 3: Estimated trend and high and low volatility, United States
Annual volatility level (σ) and estimated trend (τ) for the United States. Volatility is calculated as the
standard deviation of the previous 12 winsorized monthly real returns scaled by
√
12. Then, the Hodrick
and Prescott (1997) filter with a smoothing parameter of λ = 5000 is applied to decompose volatility
level into trend and deviations from the trend. In Panel (b), we plot high and low volatility—δhigh and
δlow—introduced in (2). The pre-gold (1800–1872), gold (1873–1913), interwar (1919–1938), Bretton
Woods (1949–1972), and the Great Moderation (1985–2006) periods are highlighted.
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The unconditional probability of banking crises, defined as the number of crisis
divided by the available sample period, is higher on average for the developed countries
(Table 2 Column IV), suggesting an association between development and the intensity
of a banking crisis.6 Figure 4 shows that within the developed countries, the United
Kingdom has the highest annual crisis probability at 6.64%, and New Zealand the lowest
at 0.96%. For emerging countries, the annual unconditional crisis probability ranges from
0% in Mauritius and Poland to 5.82% for Brazil.
Figure 4: Unconditional annual probability of banking crises
The figure presents the probability of banking crises for emerging and developed countries. For a given
country, the probability of a banking crisis is calculated as the number of crisis divided by the available
sample period.
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2.5 Control variables
While testing the effects of unusual volatility on crises, we include a number of variables
known to be predictors of crises as controls, using several sources. We use the natural
logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDP ), introduced in Maddison (2003). The database
6In an early study, Bordo et al. (2001) find that banking crises are more common for emerging
countries. The identification of crises does not vary considerably between the Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) and Bordo et al. (2001) databases. The difference is mainly driven by the different countries and
time periods covered by the two datasets and the different classification of the countries as emerging
and developed.
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provides a widely used resource for historical GDP data with regular updates available on
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/, and has been used in a number of studies, including
Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Inflation affects the likelihood of a financial crisis (see e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and De-
tragiache, 1998). We calculate inflation as the annual percentage change in the consumer
price index, obtained from GFD. As government debt may affect the probability of a
crisis, we also include ∆PD/GDP , the change in gross central government debt-to-GDP
ratio. The data is obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
Institutional characteristics and governance of a country can affect political and
macroeconomic stability (see e.g., Cerra and Saxena, 2008). We therefore use the POL-
COMP variable from the Polity IV Project database as a proxy for “institutional qual-
ity”.7 POLCOMP is the combination of the degree of institutionalization or regulation
of political competition, and the extent of government restriction on political compe-
tition. The higher the value of the POLCOMP, the better the institution quality of a
given country.
Table 2, Columns V through VIII presents summary statistics for the control vari-
ables. Emerging countries have lower GDP per capita and institutional quality and
higher levels of inflation than developed countries, on average. The differences are
statistically significant at the 5% level. We observe a considerable time-series and cross-
country variation in change in the debt/GDP ratio and inflation, but much less variation
for GDP and political competition.
7As an alternative, we repeat the analysis using the Political Constraint Index Dataset (POLCON)
of Henisz (2002). POLCON and POLCOMP are over 65% correlated and and our results are similar
regardless of the series employed.
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3 Effects of volatility on financial crises
3.1 Econometric methodology
We regress the binary crisis indicator Ci,t, which shows whether a banking crisis started
in country i in year t, on different specifications of volatility and control variables, Xi,t,
all introduced in Section 2. We first analyze the impact of volatility on banking crises by
including the level of volatility as the main regressor. We then investigate whether the
impact of volatility on banking crises is asymmetric by considering the absolute value of
the deviation of volatility from its trend, as a regressor. Finally, we examine the effect
of high and low volatilities separately by including δhighi,t and δ
low
i,t as regressors.
Instead of regressing the crisis indicator on lags of the explanatory variables, we
follow Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and use backward-looking moving averages of ex-
planatory variables over L lags, from t − 1 to t − L. This procedure, in addition to
reducing the collinearity between the explanatory variables, allows us to measure high
and low volatility for a prolonged period of time, smoothing out temporary volatility
spikes. For country i and year t, we estimate the following logit-panel regression:
logit(Ci,t) = αC i,t−1 to t−L + βΓi,t−1 to t−L(λ) + γX i,t−1 to t−L
+νt + ηi + εi,t, i = 1, · · · , N (3)
where logit(C) = log(C/(1−C)) is the log of the odds ratio, Γ is one of σ, |σ−τ | or [δhigh
δlow]′, λ is the HP filter smoothing parameter, νt and ηi are the time-series and cross-
sectional fixed effects, respectively. The moving average variables are constructed as:
zi,t−1 to t−L =
1
L
L∑
j=1
zi,t−j, z = C, σ, |σ − τ |, δ,X. (4)
When we use year and country fixed effects we face identification issues since crises are
rare events. Thus, we opted to use less granular fixed effects at the decade and region
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level of aggregation.8 Throughout the analysis, we dually cluster standard errors both
on country and year levels to address possible time-series and cross-country correlation
of residuals.
3.2 Empirical results
Table 3 presents the results for the panel-logit regressions introduced in (3), where we
consider the last five years’ information (L = 5). The first relationship we consider is
how volatility relates to the probability of future crises, perhaps the higher the volatility,
the more likely a crisis occurs. The results are presented in Columns I and II. When
considered on its own as an independent variable, volatility is statistically significant, but
the significance does not survive the inclusion of control variables. This result suggests
that any impact of the level of volatility on the likelihood of future crises is fully captured
by the control variables, especially the debt-to-GDP ratio and inflation.
By contrast, the absolute value of the deviation of volatility from its trend, |σi,t −
τi,t|, is significant as can be seen in Columns III and IV. In other words, when volatility
moves away from the trend, in either direction, the more likely a crisis is.9
To investigate further, we include high and low volatilities defined in (2) as separate
regressors, reported in Columns V and VI. The coefficients of both δhigh and δlow are
significant with expected signs in the absence of control variables: βδhigh > 0 and βδlow <
0. However, only δlow survives the inclusion of control variables: low volatility affects
8We construct dummies for each decade as follows: The first decade starts in 1800 and ends in 1809.
The second decade is from 1810 to 1819, etc. We recognize that the chosen fixed effects may potentially
play a role in generating the results. To check the stability and robustness of our results, we first
repeat the analysis without any fixed effects and with 5 year fixed effects. We also construct decade
fixed effects starting in years ending in 1 (i.e., 1801-1810, 1811-1820 etc), ending in 2 (i.e., 1802-1811,
1812-1821 etc) up to years ending in 9 (1809-1818, 1819-1828 etc). In all of the cases we find similar
results (see the Web Appendix Table A.1).
9To investigate whether volatility has a breaking point at its trend, we consider a specification with
the deviation of volatility and the squared of the deviation, σ−τ and (σ−τ)2, as explanatory variables.
We find the coefficient of the deviation term is negative and insignificant whereas the coefficient of the
quadratic term is positive and significant. Moreover, the estimated turning point equals to 1.46 with
a confidence interval of [-2.47, 5.37], hence, statistically not different from 0. We also explore higher
power specifications, rejecting a cubic specification in favor of a quadratic one.
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agents’ decision making, induces excessive risk-taking, leading to future credit problems
and difficulties for banks. The estimated marginal effects (ME) show that the impact of
low volatility on the probability of crisis is economically meaningful: A 1% decrease in
volatility, when it is below its trend, translates into a 1.01% increase in the probability
of a banking crisis.
Taken together we find that the effect of volatility on crises depends on whether the
system is in an unusually high or low volatility state. Indeed, a hypothesisHa0 : MEδhigh =
MEδlow is rejected at the 1% level, suggesting that increasing volatility in a high state has
a different effect than increasing volatility in a low state. Hence, we reject the common
assumption of a positive relationship between volatility and the likelihood of crises and
provide a new evidence that prolonged periods of low volatility increase the probability
of crises. That leaves the question of whether the impact of high volatility is the same
as that of low volatility. Although the coefficient of high volatility is insignificant, the
marginal effects of high and low volatility are not statistically distinguishable from each
other, as the hypothesis Hb0 : |MEδhigh | = |MEδlow | cannot be rejected at a 5% level, most
likely due to the high standard error of high volatility.
Our findings presented so far rely on backward moving averages of explanatory
variables using the previous five years (L = 5). In Table 4, we examine the predictive
power of low volatility by using different lag lengths. The results show a negative and
economically significant relationship between low volatility and future financial crises
when information up to 10 years is taken into account to calculate the historical average
of low volatility. Marginal effects reported at the end of the table show the change in the
probability of banking crises following an instantaneous change in high or low volatility.
We find that a 1% decrease in volatility below its trend translates into a 0.64%, 0.68%,
1.01%, and 0.84% increase in the probability of a banking crisis if the last 1, 2, 5, and
10 years’ information is used, respectively. The marginal effects increase monotonically
and reach a maximum when last five years are considered, indicating that the economic
impact is the highest if the economy stays in the low volatility environment for five
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years. This finding is intuitive: to alter agents’ expectations and allows for imbalances
to build-up, volatility should be persistently low, for at least few years. After long
periods though, unusually low volatility becomes “usual” and agents are not likely to
continue taking excessive risk during such conditions.
In addition to the volatility components, we find that the lagged crises is significant
with a negative sign, suggesting that countries that have had crises during the last 5
years are less likely to face another one in the future. This may happen, for example,
if agents become more risk averse in the immediate aftermath of a crisis than they
otherwise would be.
Morever, higher institutional quality of a country (POLCOMP) significantly lowers
the probability of a banking crisis. It could be that governance is better for countries
with better quality scores, where it is more difficult for politicians to distort banks’
lending decisions. An increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is negatively associated with
the probability of a future banking crisis. This is consistent with the experience of the
European sovereign debt crisis. Iceland and Ireland, the two countries where the banking
system was the most direct cause of the sovereign crisis, had low initial sovereign debt
levels, whereas the more indebted crisis countries, such as Portugal and Greece, had
more conservative banking systems that only suffered as a consequence of the sovereign
difficulties.
3.3 Reliability of low volatility as a financial crisis predictor
While our results show that current deviations of volatility from its long-run trend
indicate that a financial crisis is more likely a few years down the road, they do not by
themselves suggest that low volatility is a valuable crisis indicator, which would be of
interest for policymakers. We examine such predictability along two dimensions. First,
we formally evaluate the degree of the signal-to-noise ratio, i.e., the tradeoff between the
signaled true positives (the fraction of correctly predicted crises) to false positives (the
fraction of false alarms). Second, we examine the out-of-sample forecasting performance
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of low volatility, as in-sample regressions may be affected by look-ahead bias even though
we use lagged variables and one-sided filtering methods.
For low volatility to be used as an early warning indicator (EWI), it needs to
provide accurate signals on crisis probabilities. This signaling approach is widely used
to statistically evaluate the usefulness of an indicator following the work of Kamin-
sky and Reinhart (1999). Recently, built on this approach, a more general evaluation
criteria—the area under the receiving operating curve (AUROC)—has gained consid-
erable attention (See for example, Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Berge and Jorda, 2011;
Schularick and Taylor, 2012).10
To obtain the AUROC in our setting, we first run the baseline regression (3) while
removing all of the explanatory variables but low volatility, and obtain predicted cri-
sis probabilities. We then compare the predicted probability with various probability
thresholds and compute the corresponding true and false positive rates, reaching an
AUROC value of 76%, with a 95% confidence interval of [72%, 80%].
There is no established benchmark in the literature for AUROC results. A value of
50% indicates that a model is no better than a signal provided by a coin toss, while 100%
means perfect predictability. Then, how “high” is an AUROC of 76%? For comparison,
Bharath and Dittmar’s (2010) model on which firms go private delivers an AUROC
of 78%, and Berge and Jorda (2011) study the predictive ability of various indicators
on economic turning points and report AUROC values ranging from 0.66 to 0.98. In
the study most related to ours, Schularick and Taylor (2012) find an AUROC of 72%
for the predictive ability of credit expansion on banking crises. To make the results
more comparable, we keep the same sample of Schularick and Taylor’s (2012) with their
definition of banking crises and run our baseline specification. With the caveat that the
10A major drawback of the signal-to-noise ratio is that it relies on a specific threshold, which reflects
the policy makers’ preferences and loss function. For example, the lower the threshold, the more signals
will be observed, suggesting that policy-makers put a lot of weight on catching a crisis, even if it is falsely
alarmed. The signal is extracted from the estimated indicator when it breaches such pre-determined
threshold. On the other hand, as AUROC plots the true positive against the false positive rates for
various threshold values, it does not require an assumption on the threshold value and hence, on the
policy makers’ preferences.
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models used in the two papers are different, we find that low volatility alone delivers an
AUROC of 80%, whereas credit growth and low volatility together increase the AUROC
up to 85%.
To evaluate the out-of-sample performance, we first run (3) by including only low
volatility as a regressor. Using data up to 1980, we estimate the predicted probability of
a crisis for each country for 1981. Second, we repeat this analysis rolling forward each
year from 1980 up to 2010, such that the pre-1982 period is used to predict crises in
1982, and then pre-1983 period is used for crises in 1983, so on and so forth. Finally, we
calculate the cross-sectional averages of pseudo-R2 of Estrella and Mishkin (1998). If low
volatility provides an accurate forecast, then we should observe a positive pseudo-R2.
We calculate the pseudo-R2 for a range of estimation periods, finding positive values in
all cases. For example, setting the training period to 1980 and 1960, the pseudo-R2 is
22.2% and 18.0%, respectively.
Our results suggest that relatively low volatility provides a statistically significant
indication of future crises both in-sample and out-of-sample, delivering a strong signal-
to-noise ratio. Hence, it should be seriously considered by policymakers as an early
warning indicator of crises.
4 Why does low volatility lead to financial crises?
The results above can be supported by a low risk environment breeding over-optimism
and hence encouraging economic agents to engage in excessive risk-taking that ultimately
triggers a crisis—what is often termed the “Minsky hypothesis” (see, for instance, Bhat-
tacharya et al., 2015). We further explore two possible mechanisms of why low volatility
may lead to a financial crisis.
The first mechanism is excessive lending. In the model of Simsek (2013), optimism
related to the relative probability of upside states increases asset valuations and the
ability of agents to increase credit in the economy. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014) argue
23
that low volatility makes lenders feel more secure and lend more. However during a
credit boom, the quality of loans gets increasingly poor as lenders associate such periods
with low probability of default (Greenwood and Hanson, 2013). Eventually, the number
of defaults grows, putting banks under ever higher strain and ultimately increasing the
likelihood of a banking crisis. In other words, the stability in the financial system
endogenously creates financial instability. The link of credit booms leading to distress
has been studied by Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Baron and Xiong (2016), who find
that excessive lending adversely affects the likelihood of banking crises and bank equity
crash risk, respectively. As low volatility is expected to breed overoptimism, that leaves
the question of whether volatility affects excess credit.
The second mechanism is excessive financial institution leverage. Adrian and Shin
(2010) find empirically that financial institution leverage can be pro-cyclical, increasing
during booms. Adrian and Shin (2014), argue that such pro-cyclicality is a consequence
of active risk management: because volatility is an input into risk management processes,
a perception of low volatility allows financial institutions to take riskier positions for a
risk exposure threshold and increase leverage.
Limiting ourselves to the most recent history, we are able to test the excess credit
mechanism by using aggregate private non-financial sector credit data, as a percentage of
GDP, from the BIS. The data cover 37 countries from the 1960s. To study balance sheet
leverage, we use the financial sector assets over equity data of Lee et al. (2017), which
covers 31 developed and emerging countries from 1980s. The data are hand-collected
from several sources, including central banks, regulatory authorities, and the BIS, and
aggregates data from commercial banks, broker dealers, and other financial institutions.
To examine whether low volatility for a prolonged period of time leads to excess
credit or leverage, we run the following panel regression:
Yi,t(λ) = β1δ
high
i,t−1 to t−L(λ) + β2δ
low
i,t−1 to t−L(λ) + β3Y i,t−1 to t−L(λ) (5)
+β4X i,t−1 to t−L + β5IRi,t−1 to t−L + νt + ηi + εi,t.
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Here, X denotes the control variables introduced in (3) and the level of interest rates
(IR) is included as it is expected to be an important determinant of credit growth. The
dependent variable Yi,t is either high credit (δ
high
CR i,t) or high leverage (δ
high
LR i,t) calculated
analogous to high volatility:
δhighCR i,t(λ) =


CRi,t − τCR,i,t(λ) if CRi,t ≥ τCRi,t(λ)
0 otherwise.
(6)
δhighLR i,t(λ) =


LRi,t − τLR,i,t(λ) if LRi,t ≥ τLRi,t(λ)
0 otherwise.
(7)
where CR is credit-to-GDP ratio, τCR is the long-run credit trend, LR is the leverage
ratio, and τLR is the long-run leverage trend.
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Table 5 presents the results. Columns I and II show that the estimated coefficient of
low volatility is negative and significant at a 5% level: prolonged periods of low volatility
are followed by credit booms and excess leverage. The results are also economically
meaningful: A 1% increase in low volatility is associated with a 0.73% increase in high
credit and 0.63% in high leverage. On the other hand, high volatility is only 10%
significant for high leverage equation, but the equality of the estimated coefficients of
high and low are not rejected at a 5% level.
In their study of the predictive power of credit expansion on bank equity crashes,
Baron and Xiong (2016) find that the predictive power of credit expansion is especially
strong when the dividend yield is low and low dividend yield is associated with optimism.
The dividend yield is found to be correlated with stock price volatility (Baskin, 1989),
and hence during long-lasting periods of low volatility, overvalued asset prices may imply
lower dividend yields.
11The HP filter is used to extract the trend. The Basel Committee’s 2010 consultative document
considers a range of values for the smoothing parameter for the credit gap. We opt for its median value
of λ = 100. The same smoothing parameter is used to estimate the leverage trend.
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To examine whether low volatility still has a significant predictive power under
the presence of low dividend yields, we run (5), while including high and low dividend
yields—calculated analogously to high and low volatility—as additional control variables.
We obtain dividend yield data from GFD for 35 countries of the BIS sample, spanning
the same sample period. Columns III and IV of Table 5 reveal that low dividend yield
predicts credit booms but not financial sector leverage. The economic impact of low
volatility on credit booms is substantially higher than that of low dividend yield: a 1%
decrease in volatility and dividend yield below their trend translates into 0.56% and
0.21% increase in excessive lending, respectively.
The increase in financial sector leverage after periods of low volatility may be the
result of increased lending in such periods as loans constitute one of the most important
components of assets for commercial banks. Hence, in the last column, we include
average credit of the past five years as a control variable and find that even controlling
for the level of aggregate credit, low volatility increases bank leverage, consistent with
low volatility enabling banks to invest in riskier securities.
In the Web Appendix, Table A.2, we provide further analysis to address concerns
regarding the censored dependent variable. We show that Honore’s (1992) panel Tobit
estimator (with and without time dummies), Tobit regressions with random effects, and
the standard least squares with fixed effects yield qualitatively similar results.
We further explore other datasets and different definitions of excessive lending and
leverage to examine the sensitivity of our findings in Table A.3 in the Web Appendix.
First, we use Schularick and Taylor’s (2012) dataset of annual aggregate bank loans as a
ratio to GDP from 1870 for 14 developed countries. Here, we have the benefit of testing
excess credit mechanism by using a fairly long historical data but covering only a few
countries, in contrast to the BIS data, which is cross-sectionally more comprehensive
but shorter in time. Total loans are defined as the end-of-year amount of outstanding
domestic currency lending by domestic banks to domestic households and nonfinancial
corporations (excluding lending within the financial system).
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Then, we change the definition of excessive credit and leverage. First, following
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, we proxy credit expansion with credit-
to-GDP ratio gap (defined as the difference between credit to GDP ratio and trend).
Leverage expansion is proxied analogously. We find that irrespective of the definition
and dataset used, low volatility remained significant. Hence, we find strong support
that low levels of financial volatility are followed by credit booms and higher leverage,
supporting Minsky’s instability hypothesis.
5 Robustness
In order to ascertain the robustness of our results to alternative specifications, we im-
plement nine different robustness tests, focusing on sub-samples, different models and
data.
First, we examine different ways of measuring high and low volatility. One possible
alternative is the deviation from a mean rather than a trend. We calculate the average
historical volatility using 10 years of moving windows and then obtain high and low
volatility analogously as in (2).
As we use the magnitude of deviation, our methodology effectively assigns different
weights to extremely low volatility and slightly marginal deviations of volatility from its
trend. However, one can still define high and low volatility based on a threshold and
consider only large deviations. To this end, we calculate volatility that corresponds to
large positive and negative fluctuations in a one-standard deviation band.
Hamilton (2017) raises concern about the use of an HP filter, so we examine the
robustness of our findings by using the linear projection method proposed by Hamilton
(2017). We estimate the trend by running an autoregressive model at the country level,
where the lags of the process are selected through a AIC criteria.
Second, stock market volatility is expected to be related to macroeconomic factors
(see e.g., Engle and Rangel, 2008). Hence, one can argue that unusual levels of volatility
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in the market returns may be manifesting unusual economic conditions that might lead
to a banking crisis rather than unusual volatility. To show that low volatility is a
predictor of banking crises beyond the macroeconomic and political environment, we
run the HP filter in a parallel way for all of the control variables and include high and
low counterparts of the variables as regressors.
Third, Baron and Xiong (2016) show that the forecasting power of credit expan-
sion over bank equity is stronger when dividend yields are low. To check whether the
predictive power of low volatility is captured by low dividend yield, we include high
and low dividend yield in the baseline specification, calculated analogously to high and
low volatility. Dividend yield data is obtained from GFD covering 54 countries. The
earliest data point is 1855 for France. On average, we have 43 years of dividend yield
observations.
Fourth, we check whether our findings are sensitive to the definition of volatility.
In the baseline specification, we calculate annual volatility as the standard deviation of
12 monthly mid-year (July to June) returns. We first test the results when volatility is
calculated by using monthly returns up to December. In addition, we measure volatility
as the sum of absolute monthly returns, instead of standard deviation. Finally, we cal-
culate conditional volatility using a GARCH(1,1) framework. After calculating monthly
GARCH volatilities, we use the average volatility corresponding to a given year as annual
volatility estimate.
Fifth, we examine whether the empirical methodology and model specification mat-
ters. We re-run regressions without any time-series and cross-sectional fixed effects, using
5-year fixed effects instead of decade fixed effects, and report the estimates from OLS
regressions. We then investigate whether our results are sensitive to the exclusion of the
lagged dependent variable and inclusion of the volatility trend (τ) estimated through
the HP filter in the baseline specification.
Sixth, we include the level of real interest rates and the credit-to-GDP ratio gap in
order to control for easy economic conditions. Data on interest rates and credit is taken
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from the BIS for 37 countries from 1960s. As our study takes an historical perspective,
we left the inclusion of these variables as a robustness check.
Seventh, we check whether our results are robust to the chosen λ parameter. We
consider λ =100, 1000, and 10000, but as the results are qualitatively similar, only the
estimated coefficients for λ = 100 are reported.
Eighth, we test the sensitivity of our findings by considering alternative crisis
chronologies. Although the sample of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) is the most com-
prehensive for a large sample of countries over time, its accuracy has been questioned
(e.g., Romer and Romer, 2015). Hence, we merged the databases of Bordo et al. (2001);
Laeven and Valencia (2008); Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012); Schularick and Taylor
(2012) with that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for banking by using consistent defini-
tions of crises.12
The results are reported in Table 6. Although we use the full set of control variables
that we used in Table 3, to conserve space we report the coefficients on high and low
volatility only. See Table A.4 in the Web Appendix for an unabridged version of the
table. Overall, we find that the results are qualitatively unaltered under the various
robustness checks. There are small changes in specific parameter values, but the main
conclusions of the importance of low volatility hold up.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of the results to specific time periods and cor-
relations of banking crises across time and countries. We start estimating the baseline
specification (3) in three key sub-periods: pre-modern finance (1800–1913), post-war
(1946–2010), and the Great Moderation (1985–2006). Table 7 presents the results. In
12In addition, we implement the alternate set of banking crisis data of Romer and Romer (2015). As
their database includes only 24 OECD countries from 1967 to 2006, more than half of the countries and
almost the entire first half of the sample have no crisis. Hence, not surprisingly, we find no statistically
significant relationship between volatility and financial crises. We further re-run the regressions using
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) dataset for the same countries and sample period of Romer and Romer
(2015), and find consistent insignificant relationship (note that using the same 24 countries but the
full sample period, i.e., from 1800 to 2010, yields qualitatively similar results to our main findings).
These results underline the importance of using a sample that has rich both cross-sectional and time-
series dimensions in order to examine the long-run relationship between volatility and crisis, because
otherwise we run into the danger of fitting the results to the high crisis frequency or the low crisis
frequency periods only.
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the pre-modern period, neither high nor low volatility is significantly related to banking
crises. This is not surprising, as stock markets played a much smaller role in economic
activity in the early period than later would be and only the wealthiest economic agents
invested in them. Similarly, the relative importance of listed firms is lower during the
early sample period and the vast majority of banks are partnerships. Finally, as agricul-
ture was a dominant economic activity, banking crises in the 19th century had stronger
connection to commodity prices and partnership based firms, explaining why we fail to
find a strong connection between stock market crises and banking crises in the first part
of the sample. Stock markets become a much more central vehicle for financing economic
activity after World War I, and especially World War II, with the general public invest-
ing in equities on a large scale, while banks became limited liability corporations. This
creates a stronger relationship between stock markets and the banking sector. Both high
and low volatilities predict crises during the postwar era. There is a natural breaking
point in the mid-1980s marking the start of the Great Moderation, when we find strong
support for low volatility predicting crises, but not high volatility.
We then split the sample into developed and emerging economies, based on the
IMF definition. Column V of Table 7 shows that the economic impact of low volatility
is higher for developed countries compared to the emerging ones, suggesting that en-
gaging in risk-taking activities is more likely in developed financial systems. Moreover,
interestingly, high volatility channel is statistically significant for emerging countries
only. Unusually high volatility is an important driver of agents’ decisions in emerging
markets, which in turn affects economic activity and the probability of a banking crisis.
Banking crises are expected to cluster. For example, while there are no banking
crises during the Bretton Woods era, we see a large number around 1930 and in the early
1990s. Such clustering may increase the correlations across countries, create statistical
dependence, and bias the standard errors. Hence, we further examine the effects of
such episodes. In Table 7, Column VII, we exclude global and major regional crisis
episodes: The Great Depression (1929–1935), the Global Financial Crisis (2007–2010),
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World Wars (1914–1918, 1939–1945), the Latin American Debt Crisis (1978–1985) the
Early 1990s recessions (1987–1992) and the Asian Financial Crisis (1996–1998) and find
that low volatility significantly predicts crises even outside these periods. We then follow
a procedure analogous to Baron and Xiong’s (2016): For a given year, we first identify
the countries that suffer a crisis and group the crisis events into 48 distinct episodes.
We calculate the averages of the previous 5-year volatility deviations from its trend for
the countries in a given episode and use them as a single observation. Table 8 lists the
episodes. The results show that the average volatility deviation during the previous five
years is -0.534 and significant at a 5% level, showing that, on the average, volatility
preceding a crisis is statistically negative, consistent with our main findings.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we create an extensive dataset of financial market volatility, spanning
60 countries and up to 211 years. This data is used to investigate the relationship
between volatility and financial crises via a two-way fixed effects dynamic panel-logit
analysis. We further decompose volatility into high and low deviations from its trend
to investigate theoretical predictions that emphasize the effects high or low volatility on
agents’ decisions.
Our main contribution is to show that low volatility is a strong predictor of financial
crises. Low volatility over a prolonged period leads to higher risk-taking, measured as
high credit-to-GDP and financial sector leverage. Low volatility induces risk-taking,
which leads to riskier investments. Over time, loan losses mount, causing problems for
banks, which may eventually culminate in a crisis.
The results support the early theoretical predictions that financial market risk
affects economic decisions, especially when it deviates from what economic agents have
come to expect and reinforces the current literature on the determinants of financial
crises.
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Our findings should be of value to macroprudential and monetary policy policymak-
ers, as they provide guidance on how one should think about the relationship between
financial market risk and the stability of the financial system and suggest that low
volatility could be used as an early warning indicator.
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Table 1: Sample details
This table lists the countries in our sample, whether they are developed or emerging markets based on
the IMF classification, sample coverage, and the names of the market indexes. Source: Global Financial
Data.13
Country Classification Coverage Market Index
Argentina Emerging Jan 1947–Jun 1958 / Argentina Swan, Culbertson and Fritz Index /
Dec 1966–Dec 2010 Buenos Aires SE General Index (IVBNG)
Australia Developed Jan 1875–Dec 2010 Australia ASX All-Ordinaries
Austria Developed Jan 1922–Dec 2010 Austria Wiener Boersekammer Share Index (WBKI)
Belgium Developed Jan 1897–Dec 2010 Brussels All-Share Price Index
Bolivia Emerging Jan 2004–Mar 2014 Bolivia Stock Market Capitalization
Brazil Emerging Jan 1955–Feb 1993 / Rio de Janeiro Bolsa de Valores Index (IBV) /
Apr 1993–Dec 2010 BOVESPA
Canada Developed Jan 1915–Dec 2010 Canada S&P/TSX 300 Composite
Chile Emerging Jan 1927–Dec 2010 Santiago SE Indice General de Precios de Acciones (IGPA)
China Emerging Jan 1991–Dec 2010 Shanghai SE Composite
Colombia Emerging Jan 1927–Dec 2010 Colombia IGBC General Index
Costa Rica Emerging Jan 1995–Dec 2010 Costa Rica Bolsa Nacional de Valores Index
Cote Divoire Emerging Jan 1996–Dec 2010 Cote d’Ivoire Stock Market Index
Denmark Developed Jan 1921–Dec 2010 OMX Copenhagen All-Share Price Index
Ecuador Emerging Jan 1994–Dec 2010 Ecuador Bolsa de Valores de Guayaquil
Egypt Emerging Jan 1950–Sep 1962 / Egyptian SE Index /
Dec 1992–Dec 2010 Cairo SE EFG General Index
Finland Developed Jan 1920–Dec 2010 OMX Helsinki All-Share Price Index
France Developed Jan 1840–Dec 2010 France CAC All-Tradable Index
Germany Developed Jan 1870–Dec 2010 Germany CDAX Composite Index
Ghana Emerging Dec 1990–Oct 2010 Ghana SE Databank Index /
Ghana SE Composite Index
Greece Developed Jul 1929–Sep 1940 / Greece Stock Market Index /
Dec 1952–Dec 2010 Athens SE General Index
Hungary Emerging Dec 1924–Mar 1948 / Hungary Stock Market Index /
May 2002–Dec 2010 OETEB Hungary Traded Index
Iceland Developed Jan 1993–Dec 2010 OMX Iceland All-Share Price Index
India Emerging Jul 1922–Dec 2010 Bombay SE Sensitive Index
Indonesia Emerging Apr 1983–Dec 2010 Jakarta SE Composite Index
Ireland Developed Jan 1934–Dec 2010 Ireland ISEQ Overall Price Index
Italy Developed Oct 1905–Dec 2010 Banca Commerciale Italiana Index
Japan Developed Aug 1914–Dec 2010 Tokyo SE Price Index (TOPIX)
Kenya Emerging Jan 1964–Dec 2010 Nairobi SE Index
Korea Developed Jan 1962–Dec 2010 Korea SE Stock Price Index (KOSPI)
Malaysia Emerging Jan 1974–Dec 2010 Malaysia KLSE Composite
Mauritius Emerging Aug 1989–Dec 2010 Securities Exchange of Mauritius Index (SEMDEX)
13We report the name of the market index used at the end of the sample period. Given the long
historical data, it is not possible to list all of the indexes used for all countries. For example, for the
U.S., price data until 1870 is taken from Macaulay (1938), where the indexes are created based on stock
prices of banks, insurance companies, and rail roads. Beginning in 1871, the Cowles Commission’s
back-calculated composite index of stocks is used. Finally, after 1923, S&P index is used. See GFD for
details.
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Table 1: Sample details (cont.)
Country Classification Coverage Market Index
Mexico Emerging Jan 1931–Dec 2010 Mexico SE Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC)
Morocco Emerging Jan 1988–Dec 2010 Casablanca Financial Group 25 Share Index
Netherlands Developed Jan 1919–Dec 2010 Netherlands All-Share Price Index
New Zealand Developed Jan 1931–Dec 2010 New Zealand SE All-Share Capital Index
Nigeria Emerging Jan 1988–Dec 2010 Nigeria SE Index
Norway Developed Jan 1914–Dec 2010 Oslo SE OBX-25 Stock Index
Panama Emerging Jan 1993–Dec 2010 Panama SE Index (BVPSI)
Peru Emerging Jan 1933–Dec 2010 Lima SE General Index
Philippines Emerging Jan 1953–Dec 2010 Manila SE Composite Index
Poland Emerging May 1994–Dec 2010 Warsaw SE 20-Share Composite
Portugal Developed Jan 1933–Dec 2010 Oporto PSI-20 Index
Romania Emerging Jun 1998–Dec 2010 Bucharest SE Composite Index
Russia Emerging Oct 1993–Dec 2010 Russia AK&M Composite (50 shares)
Singapore Developed Aug 1965–Dec 2010 Singapore FTSE Straits-Times Index
South Africa Emerging Jan 1910–Dec 2010 FTSE/JSE All-Share Index
Spain Developed Jan 1915–Dec 2010 Madrid SE General Index
Sri Lanka Emerging Jan 1985–Dec 2010 Colombo SE All-Share Index
Sweden Developed Jan 1906–Dec 2010 Sweden OMX Affrsvrldens General Index
Switzerland Developed Jan 1916–Dec 2010 Switzerland Price Index
Taiwan Developed Jan 1967–Dec 2010 Taiwan SE Capitalization Weighted Index
Thailand Emerging May 1975–Dec 2010 Thailand SET General Index
Tunisia Emerging Jan 1998–Dec 2010 Tunisia SE Index
Turkey Emerging Jan 1986–Dec 2010 Istanbul SE IMKB-100 Price Index
United Kingdom Developed Jan 1800–Dec 2010 UK FTSE All-Share Index
United States Developed Jan 1800–Dec 2010 S&P 500 Composite Price Index
Uruguay Emerging Jan 1925–Dec 1995 / Uruguay SE Index /
Jan 2008–Dec 2010 Bolsa de Valores de Montevideo Index
Venezuela Emerging Jan 1937–Dec 2010 Caracas SE General Index
Zambia Emerging Jan 1997–Aug 2007 Zambia Lusaka All-Share Index (LASI)
Zimbabwe Emerging Jan 1969–Dec 2010 Zimbabwe Industrials Index
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Table 3: Volatility and financial crises
This table presents the results for the regression equation introduced in (3). The dependent variable is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the first year of a banking crisis. δhigh and δlow are high
and low volatility introduced in (2). σ is the volatility level, τ is the trend of volatility obtained from
the HP filter, logGDP is the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita, ∆PD/GDP is the change in
public-debt-to-GDP ratio, POLCOMP is the degree of political competition, and INFLATION is the
annual inflation rate. Past five year averages of the explanatory variables are used in the regressions.
All of the specifications include region and decade fixed effects. For the sake of brevity, the estimated
coefficients of fixed effects are omitted. The panel covers 60 countries and spans 1800–2010. The
standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and dually clustered at the year and country level.
The last two rows report the p-values corresponding to the hypotheses tests listed.
Dep. Var.: CBankingi,t I II III IV V VI
σi,t−1 to t−5 0.08*** -0.02
(0.029) (0.049)
|σ − τ |i,t−1 to t−5 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.084) (0.100)
δhighi,t−1 to t−5 0.23** 0.20
(0.113) (0.128)
δlowi,t−1 to t−5 -0.29*** -0.31***
(0.098) (0.115)
Ci,t−1 to t−5 -7.07*** -7.42*** -7.41*** -7.78*** -7.46*** -7.86***
(1.491) (1.510) (2.006) (2.051) (2.026) (2.039)
logGDPi,t−1 to t−5 -0.04 0.09 0.07
(0.198) (0.229) (0.229)
∆PD/GDPi,t−1 to t−5 -0.05** -0.07** -0.07***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.026)
POLCOMPi,t−1 to t−5 -0.07 -0.09** -0.09*
(0.046) (0.043) (0.048)
INFLATIONi,t−1 to t−5 0.03*** 0.02 0.02
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Num of Obs. 3,037 2,850 2,211 2,134 2,211 2,134
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.121 0.082 0.105 0.082 0.106
Marginal effects (%)
σi,t−1 to t−5 0.224 -0.041
|σi,t−1 to t−5 − τi,t−1 to t−5| 0.969 0.849
δhighi,t−1 to t−5 0.844 0.659
δlowi,t−1 to t−5 -1.084 -1.011
p-values
Ha0 : MEδhigh = MEδlow 0.0001 0.0015
Hb0 : |MEδhigh | = |MEδlow | 0.5283 0.3795
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Table 6: Robustness: Volatility and financial crises
This table presents the results for the robustness analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 in the first year of a banking crisis. In Column I, high and low volatility are defined
as the deviation of volatility level from its historical mean calculated as the average volatility during the
past ten years. In Column II, high and low volatility are defined as the deviation of volatility level from
a one standard deviation band. In column III, we employ the method proposed by Hamilton (2017)
instead of the HP filter to estimate the trend. In Column IV, we include high and low counterparts
of the control variables, all defined analogously to high and low volatility. Similarly in Column V, we
include high and low dividend yield as regressor. In Column VI, volatility is calculated by employing
monthly returns up to December (end year) instead of mid-year returns. In Column VII, we measure
volatility as the sum of absolute monthly returns and in Column VIII, we calculate annual volatility
using a GARCH(1,1) framework. In Column IX, we repeat the analysis without any fixed effects. In
Column X, we report the results from the OLS regressions. In Column XI, we present the results
when the lag of the dependent variable is excluded. In Column XII, we include the trend (τ) estimated
through an HP filter in the regression along with high and low volatility variables. In Columns XIII and
XIV, we include the interest rate and credit-to-GDP gap as control variables, respectively. In Column
XV, we report the results when the smoothing parameter of the HP filter is set to 100 instead of 5000.
Finally, in Column XVI, we report the results when we merge the crisis database of Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) with that of Bordo et al. (2001); Laeven and Valencia (2008); Gourinchas and Obstfeld
(2012); Schularick and Taylor (2012). All of the control variables introduced in Table 3 are included in
the specifications but not presented for the sake of brevity. The panel covers 60 countries and spans
1800–2010. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and dually clustered at the year
and country level. See the Web Appendix Table A.4 for the unabridged version of the table.
Historical Band Hamilton High/low High/low 12M ABS GARCH
Mean Macro vars dividends
Dep. Var.: CBankingi,t I II III IV V VI VII VIII
δhighi,t−1 to t−5 0.16* 0.22* -0.04 0.35** 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.32**
(0.089) (0.126) (0.156) (0.160) (0.171) (0.129) (0.162) (0.159)
δlowi,t−1 to t−5 -0.30*** -0.50** -0.03*** -0.42** -0.44** -0.21** -0.35** -0.61***
(0.115) (0.209) (0.009) (0.193) (0.174) (0.103) (0.144) (0.192)
Num of Obs. 2.158 2.155 2.247 1,976 1,248 2,181 2,134 1,618
Pseudo R2/adjR2 0.103 0.104 0.0976 0.108 0.101 0.102 0.105 0.123
No FEs OLS No lagged Trend Int. Rates Credit λ = 100 Merged
Dep. Var. Included Included Included Data
Dep. Var.: CBankingi,t IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI
δhighi,t−1 to t−5 0.15 0.01 0.14 0.23 0.35 0.31 0.04 0.19
(0.105) (0.006) (0.131) (0.151) (0.226) (0.261) (0.178) (0.131)
δlowi,t−1 to t−5 -0.24** -0.01** -0.22** -0.41** -0.48*** -0.51*** -0.37** -0.30**
(0.094) (0.006) (0.099) (0.206) (0.154) (0.137) (0.184) (0.118)
Num of Obs. 2,886 2,886 2,134 2,134 1,205 1,047 2,134 2,134
Pseudo R2/adjR2 0.0292 0.0410 0.0665 0.107 0.123 0.114 0.103 0.111
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